Highly concentrated ownership structure is a common feature in most developing countries including Malaysia. Such feature contributed to a significant decline in many performance indicators during the Asian financial crisis 1997/98. The main purpose of this paper is to explore developments in ownership structure and firm performance of Malaysian listed companies and their impact on firm performance. A quantitative approach was adopted to collect secondary data from annual reports of 369 listed Malaysia companies that are exist over the period of 2003 to 2013. In this study ownership structure has been measured using three indicators; the government ownership, local nominee and foreign nominee. While return on asset (ROA) and earnings per share (EPS) were the two criteria used to measure firm performance. The results of the study revealed that there are not much changes in the ownership structure and firm performance in Malaysia over the period of 2002 to 2013. It can be concluded economic development of the country does not much influence the ownership structure of listed companies in Malaysia..
INTRODUCTION
The issue of ownership structure has been addressed by a number of researchers, particularly in developed countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US) and Europe, for the last two decades. However, in emerging markets including Malaysia, ownership structure has attracted the public's attention, especially since the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998. Most Malaysian listed companies are characterised by highly concentrated ownership, as one issue of ownership structure (Krishnamurti, Sevic & Sevic, 2005) . Concentrated ownership refers to large shareholders, often known as block shareholders, who are able to dominate small shareholders due to their power (Mitton, 2002) . A large shareholder is defined as a shareholder holding (directly or indirectly) at least 5 per cent of the total number of all the voting shares in the firm (Amran & Ahmad, 2013) . The negative aspects of this issue, as claimed by agency theory, are majority shareholders may consider their interests at the expense of minorities (Cheung & Chan, 2004; Claessens & Fan, 2002) , and possibly committing the firm in a negative relationship with other firms that are also under their control (Singam, 2003) , either by appointing independent directors or sitting personally on the board to protect their interests (Tam & Tan, 2007) .
Many studies have discovered that government and family ownership through nominees constitute the two most common largest shareholders in Malaysian listed companies. For example, Abdul Samad (2002) found that 522 companies out of 731 Malaysian listed companies were dominated by five shareholders, including government, nominees and foreigners. Nor, Shariff and Ibrahim (2010) revealed that the government and nominees are the two largest shareholders in Malaysia. Htay, Salman and Shaugee (2013) stated that the problem of ownership in Malaysia was its high level of concentration by families via nominee companies in order to ensure anonymity. In total, the percentage of nominee and government ownership of public-listed shares in Malaysia amounted to 45.6% and 17.2% respectively in the year 1997 (Singam, 2003 (Arshad, Nor & Noruddin, 2011) . This paper therefore aims to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in Malaysian public listed companies. The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the literature review of ownership and firm performance relationship is summarized; details of research methodology are explained in section 3; results and discussion are set out in section 4 and the conclusion of the study is presented in section 5.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Ownership structure
Ownership structure refers to "the relative amount of ownership claims held by insiders (managers) and outsiders" (investors with no direct relationship with the management of the company) (Vroom & Mccann, 2009 ). Ownership structure is considered to be the key in determining the nature of agency theory; that is, whether the dominant conflict is between managers and shareholders, or between majority and minority shareholders (Mang'unyi, 2011) . It is suggested that better overlap between ownership and management should be guided to minimize conflicts of interest between them, and therefore result in higher firm performance (Holderness, 2009 ).
Ownership concentration is a common feature of Malaysian listed companies (Ghazali & Weetman, 2006) . Highly concentrated ownership was a significant contributing factor that precipitated Malaysia into the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98. Following the crisis, concentrated ownership turned into more established through ownership structure (Tam & Tan, 2007) . Nasrum (2013) found that large shareholders can be either positively or negatively influenced decisions made by management. Power of management is very much based on the ownership structure of the firm. The more shares held by the management, the greater the influence on the election of directors. This implies that managerial power becomes weaker if large numbers of shares in the firm are owned by outsiders (Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, 2002 ).
Measurement of ownership structure
Previous studies have measured ownership structure in different ways. Lee (2008) , for example, proposed three constituent elements to describe ownership structure; namely, ownership concentration, foreign ownership, and institutional ownership. Alves (2012) used three measures to characterize ownership structure: managerial ownership, ownership concentration and institutional ownership. In another study, Namazi and Kerman (2013) measured ownership structure using the categories of institutional investors, corporate shareholding, managerial shareholding and foreign shareholders. Institutional investors were measured by the percentage of shares held by governments and financial institutions; corporate shareholding was measured by the percentage of the total shares held by corporate bodies; managerial shareholding was measured by the percentage of shares held by directors of the firms; and foreign shareholders were measured by the percentage of total shares held by foreigners. Tanmanee, Prasertsri and Boonyanet (2014) measured ownership structure using the categories of government, nominees, family and politicians, as measured by percentage of shares owned.
In Malaysia, a wide range of categories and measurements have been used to measure ownership structure. Abdullah (2006) , for example, used the percentage of shares held by the management ownership (executive and non-executive directors) and foreign shareholders holding 5 percent or more of shares, to measure ownership structure. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) Based on that this study ownership is measured using the three most significant shareholders in Malaysia which are government ownership, local nominee and foreign nominees. The government ownership refers to the ratio of shares in the firm owned by the government (Nazli Anum, 2010; Nurul Afzan & Rashidah, 2011); nominee ownership typically takes the form of a company created for the purpose of holding shares and other securities on behalf of investors (Vermeulen, 2012 ).
The relationship between ownership Structure and firm performance
The question of the effect of ownership structure on firm performance has been a major concern in countries throughout the world, including in Malaysia. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This study purely a quantitative study which relied on secondary data captured from two different sources; companies' annual reports and electronic database sources. Data on government and nominee shareholdings were extracted from the companies' annual reports which are available online from the Bursa Malaysia website, while data on ROA and EPS ratios were extracted from the Bloomberg databases for the period from 2003 to 2013.
This study used measurements of ownership that have been identified as significant in Malaysia; namely, government ownership, local nominees and foreign nominees. The firm performance measurement relied on two financial measures; ROA and EPS.
The sample of the study was derived from the population of all listed companies on 31 December 2013 under the Bursa Malaysia main market. This study adopted the purposive sampling which involved 369 listed firms that have been listed under the main market throughout the period of the study; that is, from 2003 to 2013 and have consistently published their annual reports throughout that period. Firms belonging to the REITS and Hotel sectors were excluded because the two sectors had very few companies during the period of the study and were considered to be not significant. Data collected were analyzed using SPSS (version 22). Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlation coefficients were used to achieve the objectives of the study. To study examined the hypotheses in three different independent years: 2003, 2008 and 2013.
Empirical results and discussions
Ownership Structure in Malaysia
The descriptive statistics for ownership structure in this study are shown in Table 1 
ID DV
Firm Performance
The mean average of return on asset during the period ranged between 1.82 and 5. 
CONCLUSION
This study has added significantly to the literature related to ownership structure, since it has joined the existing debate about the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. However, the mixed results obtained in the study mean that the issue remains unresolved. This paper reports the results of one of the most recent academic studies conducted to investigate the relationship between ownership structure and firm performance. In this study, ownership structure concentrated on the effects of the two significant categories of shareholders in Malaysia; that is, government ownership and nominee ownership. Contrary to assumptions held prior to the research, no significant relationships were found to exist between ownership structure and firm performance in Malaysia in most of the years studied. A weak significant relationship was found only in the year 2008 between government ownership and EPS. Furthermore, despite local nominees constituting the largest group of shareholders among the three categories of ownership structure, local nominee ownership did not show any significant relationship with firm performance in any of the three selected years 2003, 2008 and 2013. Foreign nominee ownership only contributed to enhanced firm performance in the year 2003. The limitations of this study should be examined thoroughly to inform future research. Future studies may incorporate other measurements of ownership structure to investigate their respective contributions to improvements in firm performance. Finally, this study will contribute more generally by increasing awareness among relevant arms of the Malaysian government and other policy makers about the weak role of ownership structure in enhancing firm performance.
